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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ALAN KILSTROM, : Case No. 981388-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
76-6-501 Forgery--"Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose 
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government or any 
agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an interest 
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State incorrectly asserts that, "Defendant admitted 
providing an incorrect spelling to a Mike Workman, the individual 
from whom defendant allegedly received the check (R. 124:43-44)." 
Statefs brief at 4. The record discloses the following 
interchange: 
Q Tell the jury how this conversation goes down 
between you and Mr. Workman about filling out this check. 
A He just asked me what I needed to - what he needed 
to put on the check. 
Q Okay. 
A And I gave him my name and the address that was on 
my identification. 
Q Okay. Did you tell him the correct spelling for 
your name? 
A No. 
R. 124:43-44. Taken in context, the most reasonable reading of 
this testimony is that Mr. Kihlstrom did not spell his name. 
Instead of saying, "Alan Kihlstrom, A-L-A-N K-I-H-L-S-T-R-O-M, 
P.O. Box . . ."he instead just said, "Alan Kihlstrom, P.O. Box . 
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. ." This falls far short of establishing that Mr. Kihlstrom gave 
Mr. Workman an incorrect spelling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION. 
The reasoning employed by the State eviscerates the 
notion of a holder in due course as provided by law. The State 
premises its entire argument on its illfounded inference that 
anyone who touches a forged instrument must have knowledge that it 
is forged. This premise fails of its own weight. Under the 
State's theory, the proprietor of Bill's Lounge would likewise be 
guilty of forgery. He negotiated the check the lounge received 
from Mr. Kihlstrom, and deposited it in his bank account. Using 
the State's inference, he must have known the check was forged. 
Likewise, assuming that Bill's Lounge does its banking at a 
different bank than First Interstate, its bank would be liable of 
a forgery for transferring the check it received from Bill's Lounge 
to a regional clearinghouse, and ultimately to First Interstate 
Bank for payment. Obviously, the State's inference is unworkable. 
The State relies on nothing more than innocent 
coincidences to support its theory of guilt. The fact that Mr. 
Kihlstrom had not changed his Wyoming driver's license to a Utah 
license is unremarkable. The ever-present lines at the Department 
of Motor Vehicles are grounds enough to dissuade some from 
undertaking the task of changing their licenses. Mr. Kihlstrom's 
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failure to obtain a Utah drivers license certainly does not show 
that Mr. Kihlstrom knew the check was forged. 
The fact that Mr. Kihlstrom cashed two checks at Bill's 
Lounge is similarly unremarkable. Having successfully negotiated 
the first check, and not having received any notice of dishonor, it 
is not surprising that he might cash the second check in a similar 
fashion. 
The fact that Mr. Kihlstrom used different fingers to 
leave a finger print when cashing the checks is also unremarkable. 
There is no standard convention for which print is to be used. Mr. 
Kihlstrom probably just complied with the instructions of the 
person cashing the check. The whole point of the fingerprint is 
for use as an identification tool. Any print will do. 
The fact that Mike Workman's name does not appear on 
either check is in accord with common business practices. Lower 
level employees commonly present business checks signed by higher 
level officers to obtain goods and services. 
As previously noted, Mr. Kihlstrom did not admit 
providing an incorrect spelling of his name to Mr. Workman. He 
testified only that he did not provide Mr. Workman with a correct 
spelling, implying that no spelling at all was given. R. 124:43-
44. 
POINT 11. CASES RELIED ON BY THE STATE ARE 
INAPPOSITE. 
Cases relied upon by the State fail to support its 
premise. In State v. Lanos, 223 P. 1065 (Utah 1924), defendant was 
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charged with uttering a forged check. He had previously associated 
with the person whose name was forged to the check, and had 
obtained a genuine signature from him. The defendant was 
positively identified as the person passing the check, despite his 
denials. The Court held that admission of other forged checks on 
the same account was proper, even absent proof that the defendant 
knew these checks were forgeries. Lanos, 223 P. at 1066-7. The 
trial court unequivocally instructed the jury that it had to find 
that the defendant knew the check was a forgery in order to 
convict. Lanos, 223 P. at 1067. The jury was not permitted to 
infer that the defendant knew the check was forged from defendant' s 
mere possession of it. 
In State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985) , the Court 
only observed that the jury could properly infer that "without any 
explanation as to where he got the check or from whom, the 
defendant knew the check was forged." Williams, 712 P.2d at 223. 
Here, Mr. Kihlstrom explained how he came into possession of the 
check. The Court did not comment upon the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a case where an explanation is proffered. 
Cases from other jurisdictions cited by the State are 
likewise of little assistance. In State v. DeGina, 256 S.E.2d 275, 
276 (N.C. App. 1979) defendant cashed a check made out to a third 
person. Certainly one can infer from the impersonation of this 
third person that defendant knew the check was forged. In State v. 
Snider, 108 P. 2d 552 (Okla Crim. App. 1940) the court only 
addressed whether it is necessary for the State to establish an 
5 
intent to defraud a specific individual. The State's quote is 
taken out of context. In State v. Woods, 206 S.E.2d 509, 514 (W. 
Va. 1974) the court recognized that State v. Runnion, 7 S.E.2d 648 
(W.Va. 1940) criticized an instruction permitting inference of 
knowledge of forgery from mere possession. In sum, none of the 
cases cited by the State go as far as the State now asks this court 
to go. 
POINT III. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE INSTRUCTIONS 
FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
The State's assertion that other instructions were 
adequate to ameliorate the prejudice in instruction 22 is 
untenable. The error Mr. Kihlstrom asserts lies not in the trial 
court's failure to instruct that the jury must find an intent to 
defraud, but rather in the instruction as to how the jury may be 
permitted to find such an intent. Instruction 22 permitted the 
jury to infer an intent to defraud from the mere fact that the 
check was forged. Such an inference is only sensible, and thus 
constitutional, where the defendant has knowledge that the check is 
forged. 
* * * 
Mr. Kihlstrom relies on his opening brief in response to 




Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kihlstrom respectfully 
requests that this court reverse his conviction for insufficient 
evidence, and order that a judgment of acquittal be entered. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds the evidence to be sufficient 
the conviction should still be reversed, and this matter remanded 
for further proceedings. ) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of June, 1999. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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